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Jeremy N. Sheff, Marks, Morals, and Markets, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 761 (2013).
The primary theory of trademark law in the academic literature is an
economic one. Trademarks are a shorthand, the theory goes, for a
number of observable and unobservable qualities of products. The
trademark PEPSI, to take one example, is an easy way for a consumer
to identify the cola that she enjoys without having to investigate
other types of information, such as the location or corporate identity
of the manufacturer. Indeed, some types of investigation in this
regard—tasting the cola before purchase to con rm that it is the
preferred drink—are frowned upon, to say the least. So the law
regulates the use of trademarks in order to reduce search costs for
consumers and, relatedly, to encourage producer investment in
goodwill. When an unauthorized producer uses another’s trademark,
the consumer is deceived into purchasing an unwanted product or
forced to engage in additional efforts to  nd the product that she desires, both of which are
inefficient. Although economic theory may not map neatly onto all areas into which
trademark law extends (dilution law being one such example), it appears to be fairly well
accepted in the scholarly literature that economic theory provides the predominant
justi cation for trademark law’s existence.
But consumers obviously do not always act in ways consistent with economic theory. The
relationships that some consumers have with some brands transcend a mere economic
transaction; they involve identity construction and signaling motivated not by a product’s
objective qualities but by intangible, emotional responses to the brand. The fact that some
consumers are willing to pay many hundreds of dollars for a designer handbag or watch
beyond the price that could be justi ed by the item’s materials or workmanship are a
testament to the limits of economic theory.
This suggests that alternate theories of trademark law are required, and Jeremy Sheff, in his
thoughtful and sophisticated article, aims to provide one. Sheff begins by noting that
although a deontological framework in the Lockean tradition is typically the intellectual
property counterpart to the law-and-economics framework, the Lockean justi cation cannot
tell the whole story in trademark as it might for its adherents in copyright law or patent law.
Lockean labor theory, to the extent one favors it, maps best onto intellectual property
schemes where the goal is to incentivize the production of intellectual property, which
trademark law does not. Indeed, although early trademark doctrine focused, as Mark McKenna
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has detailed, on the moral notion of unfair competition, modern trademark doctrine is
primarily concerned with consumer confusion, which Lockean labor theory, with its focus on
harms committed by one producer to another, doesn’t address. Thus, the economic or
consequentialist justi cation can identify both a producer-side wrong (free riding) and a
consumer-side wrong (enhanced search costs), but a deontological justi cation typically
relates only to a producer-side wrong (misappropriation of the fruits of one’s labor).
Sheff therefore proposes a Kantian contractualist theory to  ll this gap, in which actors are
motivated not by consequentialist notions but by a moral imperative to act in a particular
manner—as one might characterize it, motivation by “good will,” not by “goodwill.” Sheff
notes that under this theory, individuals are treated as ends, not means, which requires an
acknowledgement of “the unique capacity of rational beings to choose what ends they will
pursue and to settle on actions to achieve those ends” (P. 777) and a commitment not to
interfere with those choices by lying or deception. In essence, this is a theory of “trademark as
promise.”
Sheff then turns to an initial application of a contractualist theory to trademark law.
Signi cantly, his theory addresses a hypothetical with which a consequentialist theory has
difficulty: What happens when a consumer is misled into buying a product from producer X
because of X’s use of Y’s trademark, but X’s and Y’s goods are of identical quality, such that no
harm is done? Under a contractualist theory, there is indeed still harm done: To the extent that
the use of a trademark is a promise from the producer to the prospective consumer that the
producer is who he says he is (and assuming that the consumer is purchasing goods based on
this representation), the harm is the very breaking of that promise through deception because
it deprives the consumer of autonomy in the marketplace.
To be sure, not every doctrine in trademark law can be explained this cleanly. Later in the
article, Sheff turns to post-sale confusion, a more complicated application of his premise, in
which the confused consumer is not the point-of-sale purchaser but some later observer, an
application that raises the question of whether it is the defendant producer or the status-
seeking consumer who is the breaching party. In other words, when Buyer A displays a fake
Gucci handbag, thereby deceiving Bystander B into thinking it is genuine, Buyer A may be the
morally questionable individual (at least in some circles). But it is the producer of the fake
Gucci handbag that is the putative defendant in trademark law—arguably only an accessory
to Buyer A’s deception—not Buyer A herself.
The fact that Sheff’s article leaves many questions not fully answered, however, is not a failing
but rather a testament to the creativity it sparks, and Sheff assists the reader by highlighting
many of these areas for further exploration. What, for example, would a contractualist theory
have to say about trademark infringement cases that don’t involve deceptive behavior but
instead involve an innocently adopted trademark that turns out to be somewhat similar to the
mark of another producer? Does the same notion of a broken promise exist in that instance? Is
it a moral violation for a company to change its trademark after a public relations disaster, or
for a company to obscure the connections between its brands by using different trademarks
for different products? Does a theory of “trademark as promise” limit the extent of any
changes a company can make to its ingredients or formulation while maintaining the same
brand? Put otherwise, do brand owners also have a claim to autonomy in their choices that is
incompatible with a theory of trademark as a promise to a consumer?
Sheff does not purport to set forth an all-encompassing theory, but his proposal is highly
compatible with the way we now talk about brands. We are ever more in a world in which
consumers engage with many brands as personas. Brands are trusted con dants and
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comforting companions. They  nd allegiances with different social groups at different times in
their development; they uplift us and betray us. These brands are not simply a way of  nding
goods in the marketplace; they are also a way of announcing or de ning one’s identity,
creating relationships with others, signaling wealth, or engaging in any one of a number of
expressive functions. Companies respond in kind, by creating advertising or affinity groups
that foster this type of engagement, and by aggressively using trademark law as a kind of
corporate defamation law, pushing back at uses that offend their view of their brands. If these
are our relationships with brands today, then perhaps we should be characterizing their
relationships with us as ones of promise, representations, and trust. The difficulty will then be
in determining which promises we truly expect brands to keep.
1. Sheff later offers illustrations of a contractualist theory of markets by examining contract
law and the prohibition of insider trading by securities laws, both of which regulate the  ow of
information among individuals in the market. J
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